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CONTRACTING OUT OF THE UCC:
VARIATION BY AGREEMENT UNDER
ARTICLES 3, 4, AND 4A
Paul S. Turner*
I. CONTRACTING OUT GENERALLY: VARIATION BY AGREEMENT
This Article is concerned with "contracting out" of the liability
imposed by Articles 3, 4, and 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"). Article 3 relates to "Negotiable Instruments" such as bills
and notes, Article 4 to "Bank Deposits and Collections," and Article
4A to "Funds Transfers."
The practice of contracting out of liability may be formulated in
a number of different ways. The UCC typically describes the
practice as "variation by agreement."' In addition to contracting out
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and variation by agreement, the practice may be formulated as
"disclaiming" or "waiving" liability. A disclaimer is a disavowal of
liability by the obligor. The counterpart of a disclaimer is a waiver
of the obligor's liability by the obligee.
In UCC Articles 3, 4, and 4A, it is typically the bank, not the
bank's customer, that seeks to contract out by varying the rules
regarding liability for checks and wire transfers. The principal issue
addressed in this Article is the extent to which the rules of UCC
Articles 3, 4, and 4A permit a bank to disclaim liability to its
customers for checks and wire transfers. The Article begins with a
brief discussion of the general rule for disclaimers under the UCC.
The Article then examines the rules applicable to checks under UCC
Articles 3 and 4, and the rules applicable to funds transfers under
Article 4A. The Article closes with a summary of conclusions that
can be derived from the discussion of the rules.
A. General UCC Rule: Freedom of Contract
The general rule for parties to all transactions subject to the
UCC grants the parties "autonomy," that is, freedom of contract,
such that a bank is generally free to disclaim its liability in its
agreement with the customer. The UCC states this general rule in
section 1-302:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or
elsewhere in [the Uniform Commercial Code], the effect of
provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code] may be
varied by agreement.
(b) The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness,
and care prescribed by [the Uniform Commercial Code]
may not be disclaimed by agreement. The parties, by
agreement, may determine the standards by which the
performance of those obligations is to be measured if those
standards are not manifestly unreasonable.2
Section 1-304 imposes an obligation to act in "good faith" on all
parties to transactions governed by the UCC:
Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial
Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its
2. Id. § 1-302(a)-(b).
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performance and enforcement.3
"Good faith" means "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."4 The obligation to
act in good faith and to exercise care in connection with checks is
addressed in greater detail in UCC Articles 3 and 4.
B. The 2002 UCC Amendments
In a 1994 symposium issue of this periodical, I posed questions
regarding ambiguities in UCC Article 4A and suggested how the
ambiguities might be resolved in future revisions to Article 4A.' In
late 1999 or early 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") organized a drafting
committee (the "Drafting Committee") to implement a project to
import Regulation CC6  into UCC Article 4.7 The Drafting
Committee's chair was Edwin E. Smith, now a partner at Bingham
McCutchen LLP in Boston, and its reporter was Professor Ronald J.
Mann, now the co-director of the Center for Law, Business, and
Economics at the University of Texas School of Law.
The Regulation CC project was canceled in 2001, but the
Drafting Committee was determined to continue in existence for the
purpose of making general amendments to UCC Articles 3, 4, and
4A.' At the Drafting Committee meetings, I represented the interests
of the business users of the payments systems on behalf of the
Association for Financial Professionals, a corporate treasury trade
association. The Drafting Committee considered action on a wide
range of issues, including contracting out issues and the ambiguities
3. Id. § 1-304.
4. Id. § 1-201(b)(20). This definition applies to other articles of the UCC, including
Articles 3, 4, and 4A. See id. § 1-201(a) ("Unless the context otherwise requires, words or
phrases defined in this section, or in the additional definitions contained in other articles of [the
Uniform Commercial Code] that apply to particular articles or parts thereof, have the meanings
stated."); § 1-201 cmt. 20 (discussing the definition of "good faith" and noting its applicability to
other articles, except Article 5).
5. Paul S. Turner, The UCC Drafting Process and Six Questions About Article 4A: Is There
a Needfor Revisions to the Uniform Funds Transfers Law?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 351 (1994).
6. 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2006). Regulation CC was issued by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to implement the Expedited Funds Availability Act and the Check
Clearing for the 21st Century Act. Id. § 229.1.
7. See Memorandum from Ronald J. Mann & Edwin Smith to the 3-4-4A Drafting
Committee (Mar. 30, 2000), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uccpayment/ucc3m300.pdf.
8. Alvin C. Harrell, Electronic Checks, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 283, 283 (2001).
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in Article 4A I had written about in 1994. 9
In the summer of 2001, the NCCUSL executive committee
adopted a sharply truncated agenda of the Drafting Committee's
recommendations, and the few amendments adopted at the following
summer 2002 NCCUSL meeting failed to address any of the
contracting out issues.'0 The discussion below refers to possible
resolutions of these issues considered by the Drafting Committee.
II. UCC ARTICLES 3 AND 4: LIABILITY FOR FRAUDULENT CHECKS
The general rule for contracting out of liability for checks is
stated in the Article 4 section 4-103(a) rule for bank deposits and
collections:
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by
agreement, but the parties to the agreement cannot disclaim
a bank's responsibility for its lack of good faith or failure to
exercise ordinary care or limit the measure of damages for
the lack or failure. However, the parties may determine by
agreement the standards by which the bank's responsibility
is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly
unreasonable."
Thus, while the parties have autonomy and the bank may disclaim its
liabilities, 2 the bank may not disclaim its obligation to act in good
faith and to exercise ordinary care.
A. Good Faith and Ordinary Care
As noted above, section 1-304 imposes an obligation to act in
good faith on all parties to transactions governed by the UCC.
13
However, section 3-406 does not unconditionally impose an
9. See Robyn L. Meadows, Carl S. Bjerre & Stephen L. Sepinuck, The Uniform
Commercial Code Survey: Introduction, 56 Bus. LAW. 1743, 1745 (2001).
10. See U.C.C. arts. 3, 4 (Draft for Approval 2002), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
uccpayment/annual2002.pdf. The prefatory note states that the agenda was limited to items
"where the need for reform is plain and the opportunity for justifiable controversy small." Id.
11. U.C.C. § 4-103(a) (2003).
12. See id. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (stating that "freedom of contract is a principle of the Uniform
Commercial Code" and "'the effect' of its provisions may be varied by 'agreement"'); see also
id. § 4-103 cmt. I (stating that the section "permits within wide limits variation of the effect of
provisions of [Article 4] by agreement").
13. See supra Part I.A. For a general discussion of the standard of good faith, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 & cmts. a-d (1981), and PEB Commentary No.
10, [PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) (Feb. 10, 1994).
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obligation to exercise ordinary care on the paying bank. Instead,
section 3-406(b) imposes that obligation indirectly and conditionally
"if the person asserting the preclusion fails to exercise ordinary
care," that is, by allocating proportional liability to the bank for
check fraud when the bank fails to exercise ordinary care in paying a
check. 
14
The UCC also imposes the obligation to exercise ordinary care
directly on collecting banks that take a check for value or for
collection. 5 "Ordinary care," with respect to a person engaged in
business, means the "observance of reasonable commercial
standards, prevailing in the area in which the person is located, with
respect to the business in which the person is engaged.' 6 "Ordinary
care" is the UCC term for traditional negligence.
The obligation to exercise ordinary care requires the bank to
observe "reasonable commercial standards" generally. 7  The
obligation to act in good faith, on the other hand, requires the bank to
observe "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."'" Thus,
"ordinary care" generally connotes that the conduct was not
negligent, while good faith connotes "fairness" and not the "absence
of negligence."' 9
In Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. Girard Bank,2" an agreement
embodied in a corporate resolution for the use of facsimile signatures
authorized the bank to honor checks when "bearing or purporting to
bear the facsimile signature or any signature" of two authorized
representatives of the bank's customer "with the same effect as if the
signature or signatures were manual signatures."'" The agreement
also stated that the customer "agrees to indemnify and hold harmless
14. U.C.C. § 3-406(b) (2003).
15. See id. § 4-202(a). While the obligation is imposed indirectly under the comparative
fault provisions of UCC sections 3-404(d), 3-405(b), and 3-406(b), the obligation is imposed
directly on collecting banks under section 4-202(a). See id. §§ 3-404(d), 3-405(b), 3-406(b), 4-
202(a).
16. Id. § 3-103(a)(9). A bank that takes an instrument for processing or collection by
automated means need not examine the instrument if the failure to examine it does not violate the
bank's prescribed procedures and the procedures do not vary unreasonably from general banking
usage not disapproved by Articles 3 or 4. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 1-201(b)(20) (emphasis added).
19. Id. § 4-406 cmt. 4.
20. 522 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
21. Id. at416.
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the Bank... from any damages the Bank may suffer... by reason of
its acting upon" the agreement."
After the bank had paid checks bearing unauthorized facsimile
signatures and debited its customer's account for the amount of the
checks, the customer's insurance company sued to recover the
funds.23 The bank argued that the insurer was precluded from
denying the validity of the unauthorized signature because the
provision in the agreement between the bank and the customer
shifted the risk of loss for unauthorized signatures to the customer. 4
The court rejected the bank's argument, holding that if the provision
were construed as the bank asserted, it would "have the effect of
exculpating the bank from any liability regardless of its own
negligence in paying the instruments bearing forged drawer
signatures."25
B. Payor Banks: Disclaiming the "Properly Payable " Rule
The basic rule of UCC Articles 3 and 4 allocates liability for
fraudulent checks between the payor bank and its customer. The rule
that the bank may pay a check only when the check is "properly
payable" is set forth in UCC section 4-401(a):
A bank may charge against the account of a customer an
item that is properly payable from the account even though
the charge creates an overdraft. An item is properly
payable if it is authorized by the customer and is in
accordance with any agreement between the customer and
bank.26
The Official Comment to section 4-401 clarifies that a check
"containing a forged drawer's signature or forged indorsement is not
properly payable."27 A forged signature is not authorized and does
not bind the drawer-customer whose name is forged. An altered
check is also not "authorized by the customer" when a wrongdoer
alters the name of the payee or increases the amount payable.
Similarly, a check is not properly payable when the drawer
22. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at417.
24. Id. at418.
25. Id. at 422.
26. U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (2003).
27. Id. § 4-401 cmt. 1.
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writes a check payable to the order of a named payee, and a
wrongdoer subsequently forges the payee's indorsement. Section 3-
401 states that a person is not liable on an instrument unless the
person signed the instrument or an authorized representative signed
on the person's behalf.2 The forgery is not effective as the signature
of the named payee whose genuine indorsement is necessary to
negotiate the check.29
The basic UCC rule can be summarized as follows: the bank, not
the customer, is liable for fraudulent checks under section 4-401."o
However, liability under the UCC is shifted to the customer when the
customer fails to exercise ordinary care and the failure substantially
contributes to the alteration or forgery of the check.31 Under these
circumstances, the customer is precluded from asserting the
alteration or forgery against the bank.32 When the customer and the
bank both fail to exercise ordinary care, the loss is prorated
"according to the extent to which the failure of each to exercise
ordinary care contribute[s] to the loss.
33
The parties may vary these UCC rules by agreement. Articles 3
and 4 permit a bank to disclaim its liability under the basic rule, and
a bank typically does so in the deposit agreement with its customer.34
In a partial disclaimer, the bank purports to accept responsibility
for conduct in which the bank has been at fault but disclaims all
other responsibilities, such as its liability for fraudulent checks under
the basic rule. Disclaimers in deposit agreements take different
forms, but the following partial disclaimer is very common:
The Bank shall have no liability for any losses or damages
sustained by the Customer under this Agreement except to
28. Id. § 3-401(a).
29. Id. § 4-401 cmt. 1.
30. Additional rules relating to fraudulent indorsements have the effect of shifting liability
from the bank to the customer when the perpetrator is an employee of the customer and when the
perpetrator is an imposter and induces the drawer to issue the check by impersonating the payee.
See id. §§ 3-404 to -405.
31. Id. § 3-406(a).
32. Id. Section 3-406 applies to the collecting bank as well as the paying bank. See id.
(noting that the customer "is precluded from asserting the alteration or the forgery against a
[bank] who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or for collection") (emphasis
added).
33. Id. § 3-406(b).
34. See, e.g., Triffin v. First Union Bank, 724 A.2d 872, 874 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999).
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the extent that the Bank's actions may have constituted
gross negligence or willful misconduct.
In a typical fraudulent check case, the bank has not acted
negligently and neither the bank nor the customer is at fault.35 By
stating that the bank shall not be liable except to the extent its
conduct constitutes gross negligence or willful misconduct, the
above disclaimer shifts liability in the typical case from the bank to
the customer.
In another form of disclaimer that achieves a similar result, the
bank disclaims liability for all forged or altered checks that it pays in
the normal course utilizing the bank's automated systems. The use
of automated systems, as opposed to the actual manual and sight
examination of a check, is consistent with ordinary care.36
In the following disclaimer, the bank disclaims liability even
when a manual and sight examination fails to disclose fraud, if the
fraud is not detectable by a person observing reasonable commercial
standards:
Standard of Care. We use automated systems that don't
rely on sight review in the processing of checks in order to
handle a high volume of items at a lower cost to you. You
agree that, to the extent that such systems are consistent
with general banking practice, their use will constitute
ordinary care and we will not be liable to you for forgeries
or alterations not detected by such systems. You also agree
that the exercise of ordinary care will not require detecting
forgeries or alterations that could not be detected by a
person observing reasonable commercial standards.
Thus, by allowing the bank to pay a check that is not properly
payable, this form of disclaimer effectively shifts the liability under
the basic rule from the bank to the customer.
Another form of indirect disclaimer imposes a broad obligation
on the customer to pay for account insufficiencies:
You also agree to be liable for any account shortage
resulting from charges or overdrafts, whether caused by you
or another person with access to this account. This liability
is due immediately, and can be deducted directly from your
35. See, e.g., Mercantile Bank of Ark. v. Vowell, 117 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003).
36. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(9) (2003).
UCC ARTICLES 3,4, AND 4A
account balance whenever sufficient funds are available.
You have no right to defer payment of this liability, and you
are liable regardless of whether you signed the item or
benefited from the charge or overdraft.
1. Illustration.
As an example of the interplay between the fraudulent check
provisions of the UCC, suppose that a deposit agreement contains the
following disclaimer:
The Customer shall be liable for all checks purporting to
bear the signature of or on behalf of the Customer, whether
or not the signature is unauthorized or has been forged.
Suppose, also, that a wrongdoer has absconded with the proceeds of
a successful check forgery or alteration.
(i) Under the basic rule, the check was not properly payable, and
the bank is liable for the loss. However, if the customer failed to
exercise ordinary care (i.e., by hiring an ex-convict as bookkeeper),
and the customer's failure substantially contributed to the loss, the
customer would be precluded from asserting the forgery or alteration
against the bank.37 The customer would thus bear the loss.
(ii) Suppose that, in addition to the customer's failure to exercise
ordinary care, the bank also failed to exercise ordinary care (i.e., by
not observing a timely order to stop payment), and the bank's failure
substantially contributed to the loss. Under these circumstances, the
loss would normally be allocated proportionally between the bank
and the customer under section 3-406(b).
If, however, the above disclaimer by the bank is enforceable, the
bank would not be liable for its failure to exercise ordinary care.
Instead of a proportional allocation, the entire loss would be borne by
the customer. Nevertheless, the disclaimer would seem unen-
forceable because, under section 4-103(a), the bank may not disclaim
responsibility for its obligation to exercise ordinary care.
(iii) Suppose, instead, that the bank has failed to exercise
ordinary care, but the customer has not. The bank is at fault and the
customer is not at fault so the bank should seemingly still be
precluded under section 4-103(a) from enforcing the disclaimer of
liability for its lack of care.
37. Id. § 3-406(a).
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The application of section 3-406(b), however, is uncertain under
these circumstances because the obligation of the bank to exercise
ordinary care under section 3-406(b) is proportional. In other words,
the section does not apply unless the customer has also failed to
exercise ordinary care. May the customer hold the bank, which has
failed to exercise ordinary care, responsible for the fraudulent check?
The answer is probably yes, but Articles 3 and 4 are unclear.
A draft of proposed amendments to Articles 3, 4, and 4A,
circulated by the Drafting Committee in 2001,38 would have clarified
the comparative negligence provisions by adding two clauses to
section 3-406(b). One of the proposed additions would allow a
drawer that has been harmed by the payment of a fraudulent check to
recover directly from any person failing to exercise ordinary care in
paying or taking the instrument, if that failure substantially
contributes to loss resulting from payment of the instrument, to the
extent that the failure of that person to exercise ordinary care in
paying or taking the instrument contributed to the loss.39
In the typical fraudulent check case, the comparative negligence
provisions do not apply because the bank generally exercises
ordinary care.4 ' The bank's disclaimer effectively shifts the entire
liability to the customer. Courts have consistently enforced these
disclaimers against both consumer and non-consumer customers.4'
38. The draft amendment was not voted upon by the Drafting Committee, and any reference
made in this Article to a provision of the 2001 NCCUSL draft or to any provision produced for
consideration by the Drafting Committee is not meant to imply that the provision is, for that
reason alone, desirable or should be regarded as having any precedential value by the NCCUSL
or others.
39. U.C.C. § 3-406(b) (March 2001 Draft). The Reporter's Note explains that "the drawer
need not engage in litigation with the drawee to the point that the drawer is 'bearing a loss' on the
instrument before pursuing the other party. Rather, the drawer in such a case should be able to
proceed directly against the allegedly negligent party." Id. § 3-406 reporter's note 2.
40. See, e.g., Vowell, 117 S.W.3d at 608 (holding no allocation of loss because neither the
bank nor the customer failed to exercise ordinary care); Halla v. Norwest Bank Minn., 601
N.W.2d 449, 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for bank when there was
no evidence of failure to exercise ordinary care).
41. See, e.g., Triffin v. First Union Bank, 724 A.2d 872, 874-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999) (enforcing an agreement that shifted the risk of loss from the bank to the customer unless
the loss was caused by the bank's gross negligence or willful misconduct). But see Cumis Ins.
Soc'y, Inc. v. Girard Bank, 522 F. Supp. 414, 421-22 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (referring to "strict
liability" under the basic rule of section 4-101 and holding that the disclaimer was ambiguous in
effect and void because it would exculpate the bank from its obligations to act in good faith and
exercise ordinary care).
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C. Reporting Requirements
A reporting requirement imposes an obligation on the customer
to report the payment of a forged or fraudulent check within a
specified period of time.42 The reporting requirement is not a
disclaimer or waiver and does not directly vary the UCC rules on
check fraud. When the time allowed for reporting is a very brief
period, however, the reporting requirement can have the same effect
as a disclaimer.
UCC section 4-406(c), (d), and (f) contain two sets of reporting
requirements. The failure of the customer to comply with either of
these requirements shifts liability for a fraudulent check from the
bank to the customer, even if the bank might otherwise be liable for
payment of a check that was not "properly payable."43
1. "Thirty-Day" Rule
The first set of reporting requirements is contained in section 4-
406(c) and (d). These subsections, which are often misunderstood,
prescribe different time periods for reporting (i) a single forged or
altered check, or the first in a series of fraudulent checks, and (ii) the
second or any subsequent fraudulent check perpetrated by the same
wrongdoer.44
With respect to a single check or the first in a series of
fraudulent checks, after the bank sends or makes available the
customer's statement, section 4-406(c) and (d) require the customer
to "exercise reasonable promptness" in examining the statement or
the checks to determine whether a payment was fraudulent by reason
of an alteration or a forged signature.45 If the customer should have
reasonably discovered the fraud based on the statement, the customer
is required to "promptly" notify the bank of the fraud.46 However, if
the bank proves both that the customer failed to comply with this
requirement and that the bank suffered a loss because of the
customer's failure to report the fraud promptly, the customer is
precluded from asserting the fraud.47
42. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-406(c).
43. Id. § 4-406.
44. See id. § 4-406 cmt. 2.
45. Id. § 4-406.
46. Id. § 4-406(c).
47. Id. § 4-406(c)-(d)(1).
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Thus, the time allowed with respect to a single or the first in a
series of fraudulent checks is, firstly, "reasonable promptness" in
examining the statement, and secondly, notification "promptly" after
the discovery of the fraud.48  The concept of "promptness"-as
opposed to any finite period-applies.49
With respect to any subsequent fraudulent check perpetrated by
the same wrongdoer before the bank is notified of the fraud, the
customer must report the activity to the bank within a "reasonable
period of time," but that period may not exceed thirty days.50 Thus,
the thirty-day period is the maximum allowable period for reporting
the second or subsequent check.
If the customer is liable for failing to comply with these
requirements, but proves that the bank failed to exercise ordinary
care and that this failure substantially contributed to the loss, the
comparative fault rule applies. 1 The loss is allocated between the
bank and the customer "according to the extent to which the failure
of the customer [to report the fraud] and the failure of the bank to
exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss.""5 If the customer
proves, however, that the bank did not pay the check in good faith,
the customer is not precluded for failing to report, and the bank is
wholly liable for the loss. 3
These obligations and the preclusion of the customer described
above are sometimes referred to by practitioners collectively as the
"thirty-day rule," and the notice periods under the rule as the "thirty-
day period." These terms are convenient but misleading. With
respect to a single check or the first fraudulent check, the customer
simply must act with reasonable promptness in examining the
statement and reporting the fraud.54 With respect to any subsequent
fraudulent check perpetrated by the same wrongdoer, the time
allowed is not thirty days but instead, the lesser of a reasonable
period or thirty days.5 The Official Comment to section 4-406
48. Id. § 4-406(c).
49. See id. § 4-406 cmt. 2.
50. Id. § 4-406(d)(2).
51. Id. § 4-406(e).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 4-406(c).
55. Id. § 4-406(d)(2).
454
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explains why the thirty-day period applicable to the subsequent
fraudulent check does not of necessity apply to a single or the first
fraudulent check:
One of the most serious consequences of failure of the
customer to comply with the requirements of subsection (c)
is the opportunity presented to the wrongdoer to repeat the
misdeeds. Conversely, one of the best ways to keep down
losses in this type of situation is for the customer to
promptly examine the statement and notify the bank of an
unauthorized signature or alteration so that the bank will be
alerted to stop paying further items. Hence, the rule of
subsection (d)(2) is prescribed, and to avoid dispute a
specific time limit, 30 days, is designated for cases to which
the subsection applies. These considerations are not
present if there are no losses resulting from the payment of
additional items. In these circumstances, a reasonable
period for the customer to comply with its duties under
subsection (c) would depend on the circumstances [section
1-205] and the subsection (d)(2) time limit should not be
imported by analogy into subsection (c). 6
2. One-Year Statute of Repose
The second set of reporting requirements, contained in section 4-
406(f), constitutes the Article 4 one-year "statute of repose." The
customer may not assert fraud after one year has elapsed from the
date that either the statement or the checks are made available to the
customer, irrespective of either the customer or the bank's care or
lack of care. 7
3. Comparing the Requirements and Shortening the Notice Periods
May the thirty-day and one-year time periods be shortened? The
answer is yes. The courts have consistently so held, even as applied
to customers that are consumers. 8
56. Id. § 4-406 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
57. Id. § 4-406(0.
58. See, e.g., Mercantile Bank of Ark. v. Vowell, 117 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003)
(enforcing a thirty-day limit); W.J. Miranda Constr. Corp. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 40 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d 8, 13 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (allowing one-year period to be shortened to sixty days);
Cross Creek Invs., Inc. v. First State Bank, 44 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 827, 832 (Tex. App. 2001)
(holding a reduction of the thirty-year period to fourteen days to be enforceable); Borowski v.
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The policy underlying the thirty-day rule is to alert the bank to
the possibility of subsequent attempts at fraud by the same
wrongdoer. 9 The customer's obligations under the thirty-day rule
are thus tantamount to an obligation to exercise ordinary care. If the
bank and the customer both fail to exercise ordinary care, the
comparative fault of the parties is determined, and liability is
apportioned between the bank and the customer to the extent which
the conduct of the parties contributed to the loss.6" The thirty-day
rule with the comparative fault provision may be said to be
"negligence-based" as to the conduct of both parties.
By contrast, the policy underlying the statute of repose is to
prevent stale claims and avoid assertions by the customer that may
be difficult to prove or disprove due to the passage of time.6
Accordingly, the one-year statute of repose applies "[w]ithout regard
to care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank.
62
The difference in the application of the thirty-day rule and the
statute of repose seems clear. When the customer fails to report the
unauthorized item within the thirty-day period, the bank may assert
that the customer is precluded from objecting to the item. However,
the customer may in turn assert that the bank failed to exercise
ordinary care, thereby invoking the comparative fault provisions of
section 4-406(e). If, on the other hand, the customer fails to report
the item within the one-year period under the statute of repose, the
customer is precluded from objecting to the item and is not allowed
to invoke the comparative fault provisions.
Section 4-406 does not offer any guidance, however, as to how a
court should apply these provisions when the bank and the customer
have reduced the notice period by agreement. Suppose, for example,
that a deposit agreement requires the customer to give notice of any
unauthorized item within fourteen days after the date of the bank
Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 579 N.W.2d 247, 252-53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding the
fourteen-day period was not "manifestly unreasonable").
59. See U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 2.
60. Id. § 4-406(e).
61. See, e.g., Falk v. N. Trust Co., 763 N.E.2d 380, 384 (I11. App. Ct. 2001) (noting that
section 4-406(t) "evidenced a public policy in favor of imposing on customers the duty of prompt
examination of their bank accounts and the notification to banks of forgeries and alterations and
in favor of reasonable time limitations on the responsibility of banks for payment of forged,
altered or unauthorized items").
62. U.C.C. § 4-406(f).
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statement. Is the fourteen-day period enforceable against the
customer? If so, is the period enforceable as a reduction of the thirty-
day period (allowing the customer to assert the bank's negligence) or
as a reduction of the statute of repose (not allowing the customer to
assert the bank's negligence)? Would the results be the same if the
period were reduced to three days-or even one day?
In Borowski v. Firstar Bank,63 the court enforced a fourteen-day
notice period, treating the period as a shortening of the one-year
period under the statute of repose.' 4 The Borowski court noted that
while section 4-103(a) prohibits disclaimers of the bank's
responsibility to act in good faith and exercise ordinary care, it does
allow the parties to establish "standards by which [the bank's]
responsibility is to be measured," provided the standards "are not
manifestly unreasonable."65 The Borowski court also noted that four
states have passed non-uniform versions of Article 4 that shorten the
one-year period.66
The Borowski decision, however, is questionable. Neither the
shortening of the one-year period by the parties in the deposit
agreement nor by the four state legislatures supports a determination
that the fourteen-day period is a "reasonable" one. While periods of
sixty and 180 days may be commonly thought of as reasonable, a
much shorter period, such as a period of only fourteen days, may
certainly be regarded by some as "manifestly unreasonable." A
dissenting judge in Borowski stated that the fourteen-day period
failed the "manifestly unreasonable" test based "not only on the
limited authorities, but on unlimited common sense as well."6
63. 579 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
64. Id. at 252-53. See also Nat'l Title Ins. Corp. Agency v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 559
S.E.2d 668, 672 (Va. 2002) (enforcing a sixty-day reporting period and commenting that the
period is not "manifestly unreasonable"); Am. Airlines Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Martin,
29 S.W.3d 86, 92-93, 99 (Tex. 2000) (enforcing a sixty-day reporting requirement applicable to
"journal vouchers" as items used by bank clerks to evidence instructions to transfer funds out of
the depositor's account); Parent Teacher Ass'n, Pub. Sch. 72 v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 524
N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1998) (enforcing a fourteen-day reporting requirement against a
Parent Teacher Association).
65. Borowski, 579 N.W.2d at 249 n.3 (quoting WIs. STAT. § 404.103(1) (1995)).
66. See id. at 252 (noting that Alabama, Oregon, Georgia, and Washington have all made
"substantial reductions" to the one-year period).
67. Id. at 254 (Schudson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Neil 0.
Littlefield, Payments: Articles 3, 4, and 4A, 54 Bus. LAW. 1865, 1877-78 (1999) (discussing the
unreasonableness of shortened periods). The apparent unreasonableness of the shortened period
in Borowski may have contributed to the suggestion that the agreement to reduce the period to
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The NCCUSL drafters of the UCC have traditionally adopted
the view, perhaps wisely, that legislative reform constituting
consumer protection is better drafted by consumer protection
legislators than by UCC Law Commissioners.68 However, a draft
circulated by the Drafting Committee in 2001 included an
amendment to section 4-406 that would have made any shortening of
the one-year period of the statute of repose to a period of less than
three months unenforceable against a consumer. 69  Although the
Reporter's Note emphasizes that the provision "is included solely as
a basis for further discussion by the Drafting Committee,"7 a March
2, 2001 memorandum to the Drafting Committee by the chair and the
reporter noted "[t]here is considerable support on the Drafting
Committee for an amendment that would reverse existing case law
and provide that, as to consumer accounts, the statute of repose in
UCC [section] 4-406(f) {Section 4-406(g) of the March 2001 draft}
cannot be altered by contract to a period of less than three months."'"
Pending possible consumer protection additions to the retail
banking laws, short-period reporting requirements that have the
effect of allowing banks to contract out of their liability for
fraudulent checks seem to be enforceable.
D. Liability of Collecting Banks
In addition to the liability of payor banks for fraudulent checks,
discussed above, collecting banks may become liable or accountable
for forged checks. While no bank may disclaim its obligations to act
in good faith or exercise ordinary care, the liability of banks that take
a check for collection, like that of payor banks, may otherwise be
disclaimed under UCC Articles 3 and 4.
fourteen days might have constituted a contract of adhesion. Borowski, 579 N.W.2d at 250 n.4.
However, since the plaintiff failed to argue adhesion, the court did not discuss or decide the issue,
noting, "[w]e leave these issues for another day." Id.
68. For a critique of the general disregard of consumer protection interests in the UCC
"Payment" Articles (Articles 3, 4, and 4A), see Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and
the Institutional Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11 (1997).
69. See U.C.C. § 4-406(g) (March 2001 Draft) (stating that "any agreement that shortens [the
one-year] period to a time less than three months shall be deemed to be an agreement to shorten
that period to three months").
70. Id. § 4-406 reporter's note 3.
71. Memorandum from Edwin E. Smith & Ronald J. Mann to the Drafting Committee to
Revise Payment Articles of the UCC, Observers and Advisers (Mar. 2, 2001) (on file with Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review).
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Under section 4-214(a), for example, a depositary bank has the
right to revoke its provisional settlement for a check, charge back for
the credit, or obtain a refund from the depositor.72 However, these
rights are limited. If the bank delays beyond its midnight deadline,
or longer than a reasonable time after it learns of the facts before
returning the item or sending notice of the facts, the bank retains the
charge-back rights but becomes liable for the loss resulting from the
delay.73
In Lema v. Bank of America,74 Lema maintained two business
accounts at Bank of America.75 A friend of Lema deposited a check
into one of these accounts after altering the amount of the check from
$3,000 to $63,000.76 The bank processed the check, received
payment for $63,000, and credited the account in that amount.77
Lema, unaware of the alteration, withdrew the $63,000 and gave or
credited the proceeds to his friend." When the payor bank later
notified Bank of America of the alteration, the bank debited both of
Lema's accounts to try to recover its payment.79 Lema sued the bank
to recover the debits.8 °
Lema based his suit on section 4-214(a).8 Bank of America had
delayed in returning the check both beyond the bank's midnight
deadline and beyond a reasonable time after the bank learned of the
alteration.8" Lema argued that the bank was thus precluded from
debiting his accounts under section 4-214(a).83
Lema also argued that he could not be liable for the check
because he never indorsed it.84 Section 3-401 states that a person is
not liable on an instrument unless the person signed the instrument or
72. See U.C.C. § 4-214(a) (2003).
73. Id.
74. 826 A.2d 504 (Md. 2003).
75. Id. at 505.
76. Id. at 505-06.
77. Id. at 506.
78. Id. at 506-07.
79. Id. at 506.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 508.
82. Id. at 523 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 508.
84. Id.
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an authorized representative has signed on the person's behalf.85
In addition, Lema argued that he could not be liable under the
transfer warranties of the UCC because he was not a transferor. 6
Section 4-207(a)(3) provides that when a bank customer transfers an
item to the bank and receives consideration, the customer warrants to
the bank that, among other things, "the item has not been altered. '8 7
In this case, however, it was Lema's friend, not Lema, who had
transferred the item to the bank.8"
Despite Lema's arguments, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
enforced the following disclaimer in the deposit agreement against
Lema:
Unless prohibited by applicable law or regulation, we also
reserve the right to charge back to your account the amount
of any item deposited to your account or cashed for you
which was initially paid by the payor bank and which is
later returned to us due to an allegedly forged, unauthorized
or missing endorsement, claim of alteration, encoding error
or other problem which in our judgment justifies reversal of
credit.89
The court explained that the phrase "unless prohibited by applicable
law" did not apply to the bank's liability for the check under section
4-214(a), and held that the disclaimer in the deposit agreement was
not a disclaimer of the bank's obligations to act in good faith and
exercise ordinary care.9" The disclaimer thus constituted a
permissible variation by agreement of the liability of the bank under
section 4-214.
E. Consequential Damages
In addition to the general damages available and disclaimable
under UCC Articles 3 and 4, consequential damages are available to
the bank's customer.91 However, these damages may be disclaimed
(i) when the bank, without justification, refuses to pay a cashier's,
85. U.C.C. § 3-401 (2003).
86. Lema, 826 A.2d at 508.
87. U.C.C. § 4-207(a)(3).
88. Lema, 826 A.2d at 506.
89. Id. at 505.
90. Id. at513-14.
91. See U.C.C. § 3-411.
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teller's, or certified check under section 3-411,92 or (ii) when the
bank wrongfully dishonors a check that is properly payable under
section 4-402(b).93 A bank would be well advised to disclaim
liability for these damages.
III. UCC ARTICLE 4A
The drafters sought to balance the liability provisions of Article
4A between the competing interests in the funds transfer system,
such as those between the banks and the users of the system.
9 4
In the drafting of Article 4A, a deliberate decision was
made to write on a clean slate and to treat a funds transfer
as a unique method of payment to be governed by unique
rules that address the particular issues raised by this method
of payment ....
Funds transfers involve competing interests-those of the
banks that provide funds transfer services and the
commercial and financial organizations that use the
services, as well as the public interest. These competing
interests were represented in the drafting process and they
were thoroughly considered. The rules that emerged
represent a careful and delicate balancing of those interests
and are intended to be the exclusive means of determining
the rights, duties and liabilities of the affected parties in any
situation covered by particular provisions of the Article.95
In balancing the interests of parties to funds transfers, the UCC
drafters' goal was to maintain the speed, efficiency, and security of
wholesale wire transfers while maintaining the low cost of their
transmission. To attain this goal, the drafters designed the
legislation to minimize the risk of loss to the transmitting and
receiving banks.97 Thus, the legislation favors the banks by severely
limiting their liability in provisions relating to (i) the acceptance of
92. Id. § 3-411 (b).
93. Id. § 4-402(b).
94. Id. § 4A-102 cmt.
95. Id.
96. See Stephen C. Veltri, Marina I. Adams & Paul S. Turner, Payments, 58 Bus. LAW.
1575, 1596 (2003); Hyung J. Ahn, Note, Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code: Dangers
of Departing from a Rule of Exclusivity, 85 VA. L. REv. 183, 188-89 (1999).
97. See Veltri, Adams & Turner, supra note 96, at 1596.
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payment orders, (ii) improperly executed payment orders, (iii)
fraudulent payment orders, and (iv) the availability of damages.
To achieve a degree of balance on behalf of the users, the
drafters specified that banks cannot disclaim their liability under the
unauthorized funds transfer provisions and certain other provisions in
their funds transfer agreements with their customers.
Article 4-A was intended, in significant part, to
promote finality of banking operations and to give the bank
relief from unknown liabilities of potentially indefimite
duration. This legislative purpose does not suggest that
those interests alter (or should alter) the statute's fine-tuned
balance between the customer and the bank as to who
should bear the burden of unauthorized transfers.98
As a result, despite the UCC's policy favoring freedom of contract,
Article 4A limits the ability of banks to disclaim their liabilities. The
discussion below examines the Article 4A liabilities that clearly may
not be disclaimed and liabilities under ambiguous provisions that the
drafters may have intended to not be disclaimable.
A. Liabilities that May Not Be Disclaimed
Section 4A-501 states that rights and obligations under Article
4A may be varied by agreement "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this Article."9 9 In Article 4A, the the bank's ability to contract out of
liability arises in connection with (i) the bank's improper execution
of payment orders, (ii) the non-completion of a funds transfer, (iii)
unauthorized payment orders, (iv) the bank's erroneous execution of
payment orders, (v) the obligation of the beneficiary's bank to pay
the beneficiary, and (vi) the obligation of the beneficiary's bank to
pay consequential damages."°0
1. Improper Execution
Under section 4A-305, "improper"'' execution of a payment
98. Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 838 N.E.2d 629, 633 (N.Y. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
99. U.C.C. § 4A-501.
100. See discussion infra Part III.A.1-6.
101. "Improper" execution is distinguished in the captions of Article 4A from "erroneous"
execution. Compare U.C.C. § 4A-305 ("Liability for Late or Improper Execution"), with id. §
4A-303 ("Erroneous Execution of Payment Order"). A receiving bank's maladroit execution of a
sender's payment order could constitute both erroneous execution under section 4A-303 and
improper execution under section 4A-305. See id. §§ 4A-303, 4A-305. There is a degree of
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order by the bank includes (a) the execution of an order that results
in a delay in payment to the beneficiary, 12 and (b) the execution of
an order that results in (i) non-completion of the transfer, (ii) failure
to use the intermediary bank designated by the originator, or (iii) the
issuance of a payment order contrary to the terms of the originator's
payment order.0 3
A bank cannot disclaim liability for improper execution under
the circumstances described above."° The liability of the bank under
these circumstances, however, is severely limited; only interest,
transactional damages, and incidental damages are recoverable.0 5
Additional damages for improper execution, including consequential
damages, are not recoverable unless the parties have agreed
otherwise.0 6
Improper execution also includes the bank's failure to execute a
customer's payment order that the bank was expressly obliged to
execute.0 7 The bank may be liable under these circumstances for the
sender's transaction expenses, incidental expenses, and limited
interest losses.0 8 The bank will not be liable for additional damages
except as otherwise agreed,0 9 and the bank's liability for these
amounts may be disclaimed." 0
2. The "Money-Back Guarantee":
Non-Completion of a Funds Transfer
When the payment order goes astray or is otherwise not properly
completed, and the funds are not returned to the customer, the sender
is not obliged to pay for the order; if the sender has already paid, the
sender is entitled to a refund."' These provisions are known as the
overlap between the "improper" execution provisions of section 4A-305 and the "erroneous"
execution provisions of section 4A-303; these sections also overlap with the "money-back
guarantee" provisions of section 4A-402(c) and (d). See id.; see also id. § 4A-402(c)-(d).
102. Id. § 4A-305(a).
103. Id. § 4A-305(b).
104. Id. § 4A-305(f).
105. Id. § 4A-305(a)-(b).
106. Id. § 4A-305(a)-(c). Attorneys' fees may also be recoverable. Id. § 4A-305(e).
107. Id. § 4A-305(d).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. § 4A-305(f) (stating that only the liability of a receiving bank under subsections
(a) and (b) may not be varied by agreement).
111. Id. § 4A-402(c)-(d).
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"money-back guarantee." '112 The bank cannot disclaim its liability
under the money-back guarantee.113
The money-back guarantee provisions of section 4A-402 are
related to and overlapped by the provisions that allow the sender to
recover its funds when the bank has erroneously executed the
sender's payment order. 1
4
3. Unauthorized Payment Orders
The bank is liable for unauthorized payment orders and losses
resulting from fraudulent funds transfers when:
(i) the bank and the customer have not agreed that the bank will
use a security procedure that is "commercially reasonable," or they
have agreed on such a procedure, but the bank has not complied with
it;
(ii) the bank has accepted a payment order in bad faith or
contrary to the customer's written instructions restricting the
acceptance of payment orders; or
(iii) the customer can prove that the perpetrator of the fraud was
an "interloper," that is, somebody not connected with the customer's
payment operations (such fraud is referred to below as "interloper
fraud"). "5
The allocation of liability described above is achieved under
sections 4A-202(b), 4A-203(a)(2), and 4A-204(a). Under section
4A-202(b), a payment order accepted in good faith and in
compliance with both a commercially reasonable security procedure
and the customer's instructions is "effective as the order of the
customer, whether or not authorized.""' 6  Under section 4A-
203(a)(2), the bank is "not entitled to enforce" a payment order when
the customer can prove that the order was issued by an
"interloper.""' 7 Under section 4A-204(a), when an unauthorized
payment order is neither effective as an order of the customer nor
enforceable against the customer, the bank must refund any payment
112. Id. § 4A-402 cmt. 2.
113. Id. § 4A-402(f).
114. See infra Parts III.A.4, III.B.
115. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-202(b), 4A-203(a)(2), 4A-203 cmts. 3, 5 (2003).
116. Id. § 4A-202(b).
117. Id. § 4A-203(a)(2).
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of the order received by the bank, including interest."8 The customer
loses its entitlement to interest, however, when it fails to exercise
ordinary care both to determine that the order was not authorized,
and to report the order within a "reasonable time," not to exceed
ninety days after the customer was notified that the order was
accepted or that the customer's account was debited for the order."9
The bank's liability for the principal amount of fraudulent funds
transfers under these provisions may not be disclaimed.' ° However,
under section 4A-204(b), the "reasonable time" allowed to the
customer for reporting the unauthorized transfer in order to retain its
entitlement to interest may be fixed by agreement.
121
4. Erroneous Execution of
Payment Orders: Payment to the Wrong Person
The bank is liable for its own errors and seemingly cannot
disclaim liability when, as a result of its error, funds are transferred
to the wrong person. 122 When the bank erroneously sends funds to a
person that is not the beneficiary designated in the sender's order, the
sender is excused from its obligation to pay the bank. 123 All previous
senders in the funds transfer chain are also excused from the
obligation to pay for their payment orders.1
2 4
A sender's obligation to pay for its payment order when
erroneous execution results in payment to the wrong person is
excusable under the money-back guarantee provisions of section 4A-
402, as well as the erroneous execution provisions of section 4A-
303(c). The sender's obligation to pay is excused under section 4A-
402(c) if the transfer is not completed by the acceptance of the
beneficiary's bank of a payment order instructing payment "to the
118. Id. § 4A-204(a).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 4A-204(b).
121. See id. § 1-302(b) (explaining that when the UCC requires any action to be taken within
a reasonable time, any time that is not "manifestly unreasonable" may be fixed by agreement).
122. See id. § 4A-303(c); see also id. § 4A-505 cmt. (implying that the receiving bank's
obligation to refund a payment when the bank erroneously executes a payment order may not be
varied by agreement).
123. Id. § 4A-303(c).
124. Id. Erroneous execution under section 4A-303 also occurs when funds are erroneously
transferred from the sender's account by reason of (i) the bank's issuance of a duplicate payment
order, or (ii) the bank's transfer in an amount different from the amount of the sender's payment
order. See id. §§ 4A-303(a)-(b). These kinds of errors are discussed infra Part III.B.
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beneficiary of that sender's payment order."'25 The bank's liability
for this type of error cannot be disclaimed. 1
2 6
5. Obligation of the Beneficiary's Bank to Pay the Beneficiary
The bank must pay the beneficiary after the beneficiary's bank
accepts a payment order, unless the bank has already done so.'27 The
bank must allow the credit to be withdrawable by the beneficiary as
of right.'28
Once the beneficiary's bank has paid the beneficiary, the bank
cannot recover the funds.'29 The payment is irretrievable, even if it
was made in the form of a "loan" or if the beneficiary agreed to
repay the funds should the bank not receive payment from the sender
of the payment order.3 ' The bank may not disclaim its obligation to
pay the beneficiary and refrain from retrieving the payment, and any
agreement to the contrary is not enforceable by the bank against the
beneficiary. 3'
6. Obligation of the Beneficiary's Bank
to Pay Consequential Damages
Article 4A equates the position of the beneficiary, after the
beneficiary's bank accepts the payment order, to the position of the
holder of a cashier's, teller's, or certified check under Article 3. Just
as a holder of these types of checks is entitled to be paid and may
claim consequential damages if not paid,'32 the beneficiary is allowed
to recover consequential damages from the beneficiary's bank under
Article 4A.'33
The beneficiary may recover consequential damages from the
beneficiary's bank if, after accepting a payment order, the
125. Id. § 4A-402(c).
126. Id. § 4A-402(f).
127. Id. § 4A-404(a).
128. See id. §§ 4A-404(a), 4A-405(a).
129. Id. § 4A-405 cmt. 2.
130. Id.
131. Id. §§ 4A-404(c), 4A-405 cmt. 2. A funds transfer may be excepted from the rule that
credits to the beneficiary cannot be provisional if a funds transfer system rule so provides. Id. §
4A-405(d). The transfer may also be excepted pursuant to a net settlement system with a loss-
sharing agreement among its participants. See id. § 4A-405(e).
132. Id. § 3-411.
133. Id. § 4A-404(a).
466
UCC ARTICLES 3,4, AND 4A
beneficiary's bank fails to pay the beneficiary when the beneficiary
both demands payment and gives the bank notice of the
circumstances that may result in consequential damages. '34
However, the beneficiary's bank can avoid paying consequential
damages if it can prove that it had "a reasonable doubt concerning
the right of the beneficiary to payment."' 35  The obligation of the
beneficiary's bank to pay consequential damages may not be
disclaimed by the bank in an agreement between the bank and the
beneficiary.'36
B. Erroneous Execution of Payment Orders:
Excessive and Duplicate Payments
As noted above, a bank cannot disclaim liability under the
erroneous execution provision of section 4A-303(c) when, as a result
of the bank's error, funds are transferred to the wrong person.'37 In
addition to payment to the wrong person, section 4A-303 applies to
duplicate payment orders (i.e., the bank executes the same order
twice) and to payment orders issued in an excessive or deficient
amount (i.e., the bank executes a $10,000 order for $100,000).
138
Whether the bank is allowed to disclaim its liability for these kinds
of errors is ambiguous under Article 4A.'39
Under the money-back guarantee provision of section4A-
402(d), when the sender of a payment order pays the order but "was
not obliged to pay all or part of the amount paid," the bank must
refund payment to the sender in the amount that the sender was not
obliged to pay. 4° Section 4A-303(a) and (b) stipulate that the
amount that the sender of a payment order is "not obliged to pay" is





136. Id. § 4A-404(c).
137. See supra Part III.A.4.
138. See id. § 4A-303(a)-(b).
139. Under section 4A-205, the bank may be liable for an error committed by the customer if
the bank fails to comply with a security procedure for the detection of errors. Id. § 4A-205. That
liability, however, may be and is typically disclaimed by the bank in the funds transfer agreement.
See id. § 4A-205 cmt. 3.
140. Id. § 4A-402(d).
141. See id. § 4A-303(a)-(b).
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The sender's rights under the money-back rule of section 4A-
402(d) cannot be varied by agreement of the parties.142 Thus, taking
together sections 4A-303 and 4A-402, it would seem that the bank is
not allowed to disclaim its liability for a refund to the sender when
the bank has issued a duplicate payment order or a payment order in
an excessive amount.
The ambiguity nevertheless exists because Article 4A does not
expressly forbid a variation of the bank's liability under section 4A-
303. Although the bank's liability for errors may not be waived
under section 4A-402, it appears that its liability may be disclaimed
under section 4A-303(a) and (b), unless the disclaimer is forbidden
under section 4A-402.1
43
For the two reasons set forth below, it is the better view that the
bank cannot disclaim its liability under section 4A-303(a) and (b).
First, the wording of section 4A-402(c) may be construed as
generally applicable to all types of errors. As noted above, the
sender is excused under section 4A-402(c) if the funds transfer is not
completed by the acceptance by the beneficiary's bank of "a payment
order instructing payment to the beneficiary of that sender's payment
order."'" The quoted phrase clearly excuses the sender's payment
obligation when the funds are transferred by the bank to the wrong
person. However, the quoted phrase is also subject to another
interpretation.
When the sender sends an order that the receiving bank executes
twice or in an excessive amount, then the order that is accepted by
the beneficiary's bank is not that sender's order. Instead, the
beneficiary's bank has failed to accept "a payment order instructing
payment to the beneficiary of that sender's payment order.'' 45 Thus,
if the sender sends an order to pay the beneficiary $10,000, but the
receiving bank sends an order to pay $100,000, the $100,000 order is
not literally "that sender's payment order." The sender's obligation
to pay the receiving bank would accordingly be excused under the
quoted wording of section 4A-402(c), as well as under the wording
in section 4A-402(d), which excuses the sender from paying amounts
that the sender was not obliged to pay.
142. Id. § 4A-402(f).
143. See Turner, supra note 5, at 366-67.
144. U.C.C. § 4A-402(c).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
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Second, there are indications that the drafters of Article 4A
intended to prohibit variation of the bank's obligations under section
4A-303(a) and (b). The legislative history, the statutory scheme, and
the Official Comments of Article 4A all support this interpretation.
As explained above, Article 4A strictly limits the liability of a
bank and the amount of damages available from a bank. Article 4A
also limits a bank's ability to disclaim liabilities under the Article by
prohibiting disclaimers of a bank's liability (i) for improper
execution,'46 (ii) under the money-back guarantee, 147 and (iii) for
unauthorized funds transfers. 148  The intended legislative balance
between the banks and the users of the funds transfer system is,
arguably, better achieved if the prohibition on disclaimers applies to
erroneous execution under section 4A-303 as well.
The Official Comment to section 4A-304 notes that the section
is "identical in effect" to section 4A-204, which states that the bank's
liability for unauthorized transfers may not be varied by
agreement. 49 The Official Comment to section 4A-505 states that a
''similar analysis" of the bank's liability for unauthorized payment
orders under the money-back guarantee applies to the bank's
erroneous execution of a payment order under section 4A-303. 5 '
The latter Comment appears to indicate that the drafters intended that
receiving banks may not disclaim their liability for erroneous
execution.
The Drafting Committee's 2001 draft adopted the view that a
bank's liability for errors under section 4A-303 cannot be
disclaimed.'5 ' The draft included a new section, 4A-303(d), which
stated that rights and obligations arising under this section may not
be varied by agreement.
5 2
146. U.C.C. § 4A-305(f).
147. Id. § 4A-402(f).
148. Id. §§ 4A-202(f), 4A-204(b).
149. See id. §§ 4A-204, 4A-304 cmt.
150. See id. § 4A-505 cmt.
151. U.C.C. § 4A-303(d) (March 2001 Draft).
152. Id. The Reporter's Note states that "[t]he new subsection (d) is intended to clarify that
the allocation of responsibility for erroneous execution of a payment order cannot be altered by
agreement. The same result is implicit in existing law under Section 4A-402(c) & (f)." Id. § 4A-
303 reporter's note 1.
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C. Liability Disclaimers
Despite the provisions described above that expressly forbid
banks from disclaiming certain liabilities under Article 4A, banks
nevertheless typically disclaim these liabilities. In their disclaimers,
banks use:
(i) broad general indemnity provisions that purport to cover all
or nearly all of the liabilities arising out of the bank's provision of
funds transfer services;
(ii) provisions that impose additional duties on the customer, the
breach of which would purport to shift liability from the bank to the
customer;
(iii) other forms of indirect disclaimers or broad agreements to
pay, which have the effect of disclaiming the bank's liabilities;
(iv) partial disclaimers, which exclude from coverage the
liability the bank might typically incur; and
(v) agreements pursuant to section 4A-202(c) regarding security
procedures that may be less than commercially reasonable. 53
Samples of typical disclaimers used by banks are set forth
below.
1. Broad Indemnities
A broad indemnity generally disclaims the bank's responsibility
for all obligations and liabilities arising out of the agreement. An
example of a broad indemnity is set forth below:
The Customer shall indemnify the Bank, its officers,
directors, agents and employees (each an "Indemnitee") and
hold each Indemnitee harmless from and against any and all
liabilities, obligations, actions, suits, costs, expenses, losses,
damages, or other claims, including reasonable attorneys'
fees and litigation costs, of whatever nature, arising out of
or relating to the performance by the Bank of funds transfer
services under this Agreement.
Such a broad indemnity conflicts with the provisions that forbid
disclaimers by purporting to disclaim the bank's liability for the
improper execution of payment orders, the failure to properly
complete funds transfers, unauthorized payment orders, the
erroneous execution of payment orders, and consequential damages.
153. See discussion infra Part III.C. 1-5.
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Therefore, the indemnity would not be enforceable.
2. The Imposition of Additional Customer Duties
By imposing additional duties on the customer, such as
confidentiality, as well as those attributable to the customer when the
customer seeks to prove interloper fraud,'54 the bank purports to shift
liability to the customer for an unauthorized payment order when the
customer has not complied with these additional duties. The
following disclaimer appears in a Sample ODFI-Originator
Agreement contained in the National Automated Clearing House
Association ("NACHA") Operating Guidelines:
Company is strictly responsible to establish and maintain
the procedures to safeguard against unauthorized
transmissions. Company warrants that no individual will be
allowed to initiate transfers in the absence of proper
supervision and safeguards, and agrees to take reasonable
steps to maintain the confidentiality of the security
procedures and any passwords, codes, security devices and
related instructions provided by Financial Institution in
connection with the security procedures described in
Schedule B. If Company believes or suspects that any such
information or instructions have been known or accessed by
unauthorized persons, Company agrees to notify Financial
Institution immediately followed by written confirmation.'55
3. Indirect Disclaimers: Broad Agreements to Pay
Broad indemnities and provisions imposing additional duties on
the customer, described above, are forms of indirect disclaimers. An
indirect disclaimer typically does not use normative terms, such as
"liability," "obligation," "fault," or "error."
Another common form of indirect disclaimer is a broad
agreement to pay for all payment orders:
The Customer agrees to pay the Bank the amount of all
payment orders issued by the Bank in the execution of
154. The customer must prove that the interloper did not "obtain[] access to transmitting
facilities of the customer" or obtain "from a source controlled by the customer ... information
facilitating breach of the security procedure." U.C.C. § 4A-203(a)(2).
155. NACHA OPERATING GUIDELINES 2.1.30 (2006) (Sample ODFI-Originator Agreement
2(b)).
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payment orders purporting to be the payment orders of the
Customer.
In the following variation, the customer is made liable for all
payment orders accepted in compliance with the agreed upon
security procedure:
Bank and Customer agree to use a unique Wire Transfer
Authorization Code as the security procedure. Customer's
Authorized Representative shall provide Bank with a
unique Wire Transfer Authorization Code when initiating,
amending or canceling a Wire Transfer Request. Bank may
execute any Wire Transfer Request where Bank is provided
a Wire Transfer Authorization Code properly assigned to
Customer's account, thereby assuming that such Wire
Transfer Request is authorized. Customer is responsible
and assumes all liabilities in connection with an Order
where a valid Wire Transfer Authorization Code is used.
Of course, the above disclaimers would not be enforceable in cases
where a security procedure was not commercially reasonable, the
bank failed to act in good faith or in compliance with the customer's
instructions, or there was interloper fraud.
In the following variation, the bank limits its damages to a
nominal amount:
The liability of the Bank in connection with its execution of
the Customer's payment orders shall not exceed the charges
and fees paid by the Customer to the Bank for all funds
transfer services rendered by the Bank during the three-
month period preceding the month in which the payment
order was executed by the Bank.
All of the disclaimers quoted above would be unenforceable to
the extent that each conflicts with the prohibitions on disclaimers in
Article 4A, including the prohibitions relating to the improper
execution of payment orders, the non-completion of funds transfers,
unauthorized payment orders, and the erroneous execution of
payment orders.
4. Partial Disclaimers
In a partial disclaimer, the bank purports to accept responsibility
for conduct in which the bank itself was at fault, but disclaims all
other responsibilities. Typically, the bank purports to accept
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responsibility only for its own negligence, bad faith, or "willful
misconduct," thereby indirectly excluding the liability allocated to
the bank by Article 4A for the improper execution of payment
orders, the non-completion of funds transfers, unauthorized payment
orders, and the erroneous execution of payment orders.
The following provisions, for example, appear in the NACHA
Sample ODFI-Originator Agreement:
Financial Institution shall be responsible only for
performing the services expressly provided for in this
Agreement, and shall be liable only for its negligence or
willful misconduct in performing those services. 5 6
However, the foregoing disclaimer would not be effective to vary the
bank's liability for the improper execution of payment orders, the
non-completion of funds transfers, unauthorized payment orders, and
the erroneous execution of payment orders.
The following disclaimer, which also appears in the NACHA
Sample ODFI-Originator Agreement, relates to unauthorized
payment orders:
If an Entry (or a request for cancellation or amendment of
an Entry) received by Financial Institution purports to have
been transmitted or authorized by Company, it will be
deemed effective as Company's Entry (or request) and
Company shall be obligated to pay Financial Institution the
amount of such Entry even though the Entry (or request)
was not authorized by Company, provided Financial
Institution accepted the Entry in good faith and acted in
compliance with the security procedures referred to in
Schedule B with respect to such entry.57
In this disclaimer, the bank accepts its responsibility to act in good
faith and in compliance with the security procedure, but the customer
otherwise accepts responsibility for fraudulent payment orders.
Despite the disclaimer, the bank would be liable for a fraudulent
transfer if the security procedure was not "commercially reasonable,"
if the bank failed to comply with the customer's written instructions
restricting the acceptance of payment orders, or in the case of
156. Id. (Sample ODFI-Originator Agreement 14(a)).
157. Id. (Sample ODFI-Originator Agreement 3).
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interloper fraud.158
5. Agreements Pursuant to Section 4A-202(c)
Section 4A-202(c) contemplates that some customers will be
unwilling to pay for a commercially reasonable security procedure.'59
When that occurs, the section allows the bank to agree to a procedure
that may not be commercially reasonable and still avoid liability for
fraudulent transfers, despite the procedure's commercial
unreasonableness.16 ° The bank avoids liability, however, only if the
customer has expressly consented to the procedure in writing. 6' The
wording of the customer's consent is dictated by section 4A-202(c)
and is typically as follows:
The Bank has offered and the Customer has rejected the
security procedure described on Exhibit A. The Customer
has chosen instead the security procedure described on
Exhibit B (the "Security Procedure"). The Customer agrees
to be bound by any payment order, whether or not
authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the Bank in
compliance with the Security Procedure.
Two problems arise in connection with the use of section 4A-
202(c) agreements. First, some banks use the agreements as a
standard provision within their funds transfer agreements, rather than
as an exception to the general rule. Second, the wording of the
section 4A-202(c) agreement conflicts with the Article 4A provisions
on interloper fraud.
a. Use of the section 4A-202(c) agreement as a standard provision
The section 4A-202(c) agreement should only be used under
circumstances in which the bank has actually offered the customer a
security procedure that is commercially reasonable, and the customer
has rejected the proffered procedure and knowingly chosen a security
procedure that may not be commercially reasonable. In other words,
the bank should not attempt to apply the section 4A-202(c) exception
to the general rule in lieu of the general rule.
158. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-202(b), 4A-203(a)(2) (2003).
159. Id. § 4A-202(c).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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The last sentence of the section 4A-202(c) agreement sometimes
appears as a standard provision in the bank's funds transfer
agreement, shorn of the recitals that normally precede it. The literal
result is a broad disclaimer of liability for unauthorized payment
orders accepted in compliance with the security procedure:
The Customer agrees to be bound by any payment order,
whether or not authorized, issued in its name and accepted
by the Bank in compliance with the Security Procedure.
It is not good practice, and reflects poorly on the bank's good
faith, for the bank to incorporate the section 4A-202(c) agreement
into its standard funds transfer agreement form. Nor is it good
practice for the customer to agree to the section 4A-202(c) agreement
except when (i) the customer has knowingly accepted the lesser
security procedure, (ii) the section 4A-202(c) agreement contains the
appropriate recitals, and (iii) the recitals are true.
b. Section 4A-202(c) agreements and interloper fraud
In agreeing "to be bound by any payment order, whether or not
authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the bank," the
customer would seem to literally agree to be liable for fraud
perpetrated by an "interloper." '162 Under section 4A-203(a)(2), an
interloper is a person who (i) was not entrusted to act for the
customer with respect to either payment orders or the security
procedure, or (ii) did not obtain access to the customer's transmitting
facilities or to information facilitating a breach of the security
procedure from a source controlled by the customer.'63 Section 4A-
203(a)(2) provides that the bank is liable for losses caused by fraud
when the customer can prove that the payment order was issued by
an interloper.,6
Suppose, for example, that the customer has agreed to use a
security procedure that is less than commercially reasonable under
section 4A-202(c). Fraud is perpetrated, and the customer can prove
162. See id. § 4A-202(c)(ii); see also THOMAS C. BAXTER, JR., STEPHANIE A. HELLER &
PAUL S. TURNER, THE ABCS OF THE UCC: ARTICLE 4A: FUNDS TRANSFERS 67 (Amelia H. Boss
ed., 2d ed. 2006) (explaining that the term "interloper" is commonly used by practitioners to
describe a perpetrator of fraud who is not associated with the customer). The customer would
also seem to be liable when the bank fails to act in good faith or in compliance with the
customer's written instructions restricting the acceptance of payment orders. See id. § 4A-202(b).
163. Id. § 4A-203(a)(2).
164. Id.
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that the wrongdoer is the president of the bank. The president would
be an interloper under section 4A-203(a)(2), with the apparent result
that the bank would be liable for the loss under that section. The
bank, however, would seek to enforce the customer's agreement to
be "bound by any payment order, whether or not authorized," as
provided in the section 4A-202(c) agreement.'65 Whether or not the
customer's agreement is enforceable under these circumstances is an
ambiguity under Article 4A.'66
The Drafting Committee's 2001 draft would have clarified this
ambiguity by stating, in a Comment, that the section 4A-202(c)
agreement only resolves the issue of commercial reasonableness and
does not otherwise shift any liability to the customer, as follows:
Subsection (c) [of section 4A-202] provides that a
security procedure to which a customer agrees in specified
circumstances is deemed to be commercially reasonable.
Such an agreement resolves only the issue of commercial
reasonableness. When the commercial reasonableness of
the security procedure has no bearing on the issue of
responsibility for a fraudulent order, that provision does not
cause the customer's agreement otherwise to shift liability
under the rules that apply to such orders. Thus, for
example, the customer's agreement to be bound under
subsection (c) would be subject to the rule that the bank is
liable (as specified in subsection 4A-203(a)(ii)) for certain
orders authorized by commercially reasonable security
procedures, if the fraud is perpetrated by a person not
associated with the customer's fund-transfer operations.'67
D. Reporting Requirements
A reporting requirement in the funds transfer agreement obliges
the customer to report an objectionable funds transfer to the bank
within a specified period of time. The reporting requirement is not a
disclaimer and does not directly vary the Article 4A liability rules.
However, when the time allowed for reporting the objectionable
165. Id. § 4A-202(c)(ii).
166. See Turner, supra note 5, at 360-63.
167. U.C.C. § 4A-202 cmt. 1 (March 2001 Draft). I participated in the wording of the
Comment and understand that the Reporter spoke to one of the Article 4A Reporters before
incorporating the Comment into the draft.
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transfer is a very brief period, the reporting requirement can shift
liability to the customer, and thus, have virtually the same effect as a
disclaimer.
1. Interest Entitlement
The bank is obliged to pay interest to the customer, inter alia,
when the bank is liable to the customer in the principal amount of (i)
an unauthorized funds transfer,'68 (ii) a payment order that the bank
erroneously executes,'69 and (iii) a funds transfer that is not properly
completed and is subject to the "money-back guarantee."'7 °  The
customer loses entitlement to interest, however, when the customer
fails to exercise ordinary care to determine that the order was not
authorized or was erroneously executed, and fails to report the order
within a "reasonable time" not exceeding ninety days after notice. 7'
While the bank's liability for these principal and interest
amounts may not be directly disclaimed,'72 the bank's funds transfer
agreement typically provides that the bank's liability is subject to the
customer's compliance with a reporting requirement. With respect to
the principal amount of the transfer, the New York Court of Appeals
has held that a bank cannot enforce a provision in a funds transfer
agreement that requires the customer to report an unauthorized funds
transfer within a period that is less than the one-year period specified
in section 4A-505, as discussed below.'73
With respect to interest on the principal amount, however, the
reporting requirement is statutory, and the statutory period of a
reasonable time not to exceed ninety days may be varied by an
agreement fixing any reasonable period other than ninety days.
174
Under section 1-302(b), when the UCC requires any action to be
taken within a reasonable time, any time that is not "manifestly
unreasonable" may be fixed by agreement.
75
168. U.C.C. § 4A-204(a) (2003).
169. Id. § 4A-304.
170. Id. 4A-402(d). Unless otherwise agreed, the interest rate is an average of the Federal
Funds rate of the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Id. § 4A-506(b).
171. Id. §§ 4A-204(a), 4A-304, 4A-402(d).
172. Id. §§ 4A-204(b), 4A-402(f). Whether the bank may disclaim its liability for erroneous
execution involving duplicate or excessive payment orders is discussed supra Part IJI.B.
173. Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 838 N.E.2d 629, 633 (N.Y. 2005), discussed infra.
174. See U.C.C. § 1-302(b).
175. Id.
Fall 2006]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:443
2. The One-Year Statute of Repose
Section 4A-505, commonly known as the Article 4A "statute of
repose,"' 76 allows the customer a period of one year after notification
to object to any payment order purporting to be the customer's
order.'77 If the customer fails to object to an order that is disclosed in
the customer's periodic bank statement within one year of receiving
the statement, the customer is thereafter precluded from objecting to
the bank being paid for that order. 8
As a result, a customer who delays in objecting to a transfer
until after the one-year period has expired is precluded from
asserting the bank's liability for the transfer, even though the
customer might have been entitled to hold the bank liable for the
transfer under the nonvariable provisions of Article 4A, such as (i)
the "money back guarantee,"'79 (ii) the provisions relating to
fraudulent transfers, 8 ° or (iii) the provisions relating to improper or
erroneous execution by the bank.'
Suppose the funds transfer agreement has shortened the period
under the statute of repose from the one-year period to a fifteen-day
period. Would a customer asserting these nonvariable provisions be
barred from objecting to a transfer when the customer has failed to
object within the fifteen days?'82
As noted above, section 4A-501(a) provides that rights and
obligations under Article 4A may be varied by agreement "[e]xcept
as otherwise provided in this Article."'83  Article 4A contains no
provision that prohibits a bank from reducing the one-year period to
a lesser period. Thus, at the threshold, it seems that a bank may
enforce a reduction of the one-year period to a lesser-perhaps any
lesser-period.
On the other hand, if the lesser period is enforceable in a case in
which the bank would otherwise be liable, and the bank's liability
176. See id. § 4A-505 cmt.
177. Id. § 4A-505.
178. Id.
179. Id. § 4A-402(c)-(d).
180. Id. §§ 4A-202 to -204.
181. Id. §§ 4A-303,4A-305.
182. See Turner, supra note 5, at 358-60 (examining the conflicts between the variable and
nonvariable provisions of Article 4A and discussing whether the one-year period under the statute
of repose may be shortened by agreement).
183. U.C.C. § 4A-501(a).
UCC ARTICLES 3,4, AND 4A
may not be varied by agreement, the result of enforcing the reporting
requirement is to vary a provision of Article 4A that may not be
varied by agreement.
To illustrate the conflict between the apparently variable one-
year period under the statute of repose and the nonvariable
provisions regarding fraudulent funds transfers, suppose the bank
fails to verify the customer's payment order in accordance with the
agreed upon security procedure, and funds are fraudulently
transferred out of the customer's account. The bank would normally
be liable for the loss and be required to refund the amount of the
transfer to the customer under sections 4A-202(b) and 4A-204(a).
Suppose, also, that the customer breaches an obligation to give
notice within thirty days after receipt of the periodic statement, in
accordance with the following provision:
Entries transmitted by Financial Institution or credited to a
Receiver's account maintained with Financial Institution
will be reflected on Company's periodic statement issued
by Financial Institution with respect to the Account
pursuant to the agreement between Financial Institution and
Company. Company agrees to notify Financial Institution
promptly of any discrepancy between Company's records
and the information shown on any periodic statement. If
Company fails to notify Financial Institution of any
discrepancy within [fifteen] days of receipt of a periodic
statement containing such information, Company agrees
that Financial Institution shall not be liable for any other
losses resulting from Company's failure to give such notice
or any loss of interest or any interest equivalent with respect
to an Entry shown on such periodic statement. If Company
fails to notify Financial Institution of any such discrepancy
within [thirty] days of receipt of such periodic statement,
Company shall be precluded from asserting such
discrepancy against Financial Institution. 184
It is not clear whether the thirty-day preclusion period in the
foregoing provision should be held to be (i) enforceable against the
customer as a permissible reduction of the statute of repose under
184. NACHA OPERATING GUIDELINES 2.1.30 (2006) (Sample ODFI-Originator Agreement
12) (emphasis added). The NACHA form contains blanks for the numbers of days.
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section 4A-505, or (ii) unenforceable as an impermissible variation
of the nonvariable section 4A-202.
The issue of the enforceability of a short-period reporting
requirement arises not only in the case of a fraudulent payment order,
but also in the case of the customer's nonvariable right to a refund
from the bank under the money-back guarantee provisions of section
4A-402(c) and (d). Similarly, a shortened notice period could
conflict with the customer's nonvariable right to compensation or a
refund in the case of a payment order improperly or erroneously
executed by the bank.'85
3. The Regatos Case
The issue of the enforceability of a short-period reporting
requirement was squarely confronted in Regatos v. North Fork
Bank."'86 Regatos conducted a construction business from an office in
his home in Brazil and maintained a bank account at the Commercial
Bank of New York in New York City.'87 Regatos originated funds
transfers from his office out of the account in New York.'88
The deposit agreement required Regatos to report unauthorized
funds transfers within fifteen days of the time the bank statement was
mailed or made available to him.'89 A constructive notice provision
in the agreement stipulated that if he authorized the bank to withhold
his correspondence, the fifteen-day reporting requirement would
apply as if he received the statement on the date shown on the
statement. 9 ' Whether Regatos had authorized the bank to withhold
his correspondence was a disputed issue in the litigation, but in fact,
his bank statements were sent to him only when he requested them. 9'
The security procedure that the bank and Regatos used was a
telephone-confirmation procedure."92 Regatos would fax a payment
order form to a bank representative at the bank's office in Sao Paulo,
and then call the representative on the telephone to confirm receipt of
185. See supra note 101.
186. 257 F. Supp. 2d 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd, 431 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2005), conforming to
certified questions answered by 838 N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 2005).
187. Id. at 635-36.
188. Id. at 636.
189. Id. at 635.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 635-36.
192. Id. at 636.
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the fax.'93 If Regatos failed to call right away, the representative
would call him to confirm the order.'94
In March and April 2001, two funds transfers totaling $600,000
were made out of the account.'95 Regatos asserted that the transfers
were unauthorized and notified the bank of his objection to the
transfers in August, on the same day he received actual notice of the
transfers but about five months after the date of the account
statement disclosing the first transfer, and four months after the date
of the statement disclosing the second transfer.'96
Regatos sued to recover the transfers, alleging that the Sao Paulo
office had not complied with the security procedure by calling him to
confirm the payment orders initiating the transfers."' The bank
moved for summary judgment based on Regatos' failure to comply
with the fifteen-day reporting requirement.'98 The district court
denied the motion, holding that the reporting requirement was not
enforceable because it conflicted with Regatos' nonvariable right to a
refund when the bank failed to comply with the security procedure.'99
The jury found in favor of Regatos, and the district court
awarded him both principal and interest from the date the bank had
transferred the funds.2"' The bank appealed, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified to the New York
Court of Appeals the following questions:
[1] Can the one-year statute of repose established
by... U.C.C. Article [4A]-505 be varied by agreement? If
so, are there any minimum limits on the variation thereof
(such as "reasonable time") that estop [the bank] from
denying Regatos recovery in this case?
[2] In the absence of agreement, does... U.C.C.
Article [4A] require actual notice, rather than merely
constructive notice? If so, can this requirement be altered
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 636-37.
196. Id. at 637.
197. Id. at 634, 637.
198. Id. at 634-35.
199. Id. at 643.
200. Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 838 N.E.2d 629, 631 (N.Y. 2005).
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by agreement of the parties and was such achieved here?2"'
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
holding that the one-year period could not be reduced by
agreement.22 The Court of Appeals considered whether the one-year
period should be regarded as an integral part of the bank's obligation
to refund payment under section 4A-204, in which case the period
could not be reduced by agreement, or whether the customer's duty
to notify the bank of the error before recovering the transferred funds
is an obligation separate from the refund provisions of section 4A-
204, in which case the period could be reduced by agreement. 203 The
court deemed the one-year period integral to the customer's right of
recovery and accordingly held that the period was nonvariable. 2°4 It
explained that "[p]ermitting banks to vary the notice period by
agreement would reduce the effectiveness of the statute's one-year
period of repose as an incentive for banks to create and follow
security procedures. 2 5
The Court of Appeals also cited the distinction drawn by the
district court between the substantive rights and obligations
addressed in Parts 1 through 4 of Article 4A and the "Miscellaneous
Provisions" addressed in Part 5.206 The court noted that "[t]he period
of repose in section [4A-505] is essentially a jurisdictional attribute
of the 'rights and obligations' contained in [section 4A-204(a)]. 2 °7
As a "jurisdictional attribute," the one-year period under section 4A-
505 is presumably subordinate to the customer's substantive rights
under section 4A-204(a), and that consideration supported the court's
conclusion that to "vary the period of repose would, in effect, impair
the customer's section [4A-204(a)] right to a refund, a modification
that section [4A-204(a)] forbids.
28
The court thus answered the first of the certified questions in the
negative: the one-year statute of repose established under section 4A-
201. Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 396 F.3d 493, 498-99 (2d Cir. 2005) (foot-
note omitted).
202. Regatos, 838 N.E.2d at 633.
203. Id. at 632.
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505 may not be varied by agreement.209 Accordingly, Regatos was
entitled to recover the principal amount of the transfers.21°
The court then addressed the second of the certified questions
and held that constructive notice was not sufficient, that the statute
required actual notice, and that the requirement of actual notice could
not be varied by agreement. Since Regatos gave notice of his
objection to the transfers promptly upon receipt of actual notice, he
acted well within the "reasonable time not exceeding [ninety] days"
period stipulated in section 4A-204(a), and was thus entitled to
interest.2 2 The court stated:
Just as the one-year notice limitation is an inherent aspect
of the customer's right to recover unauthorized payments,
the actual notice requirement provides the bedrock for the
exercise of that right. Permitting banks to enforce
"agreements" to accept constructive notice would defeat
[A]rticle [4A]'s guarantee of recovery for unauthorized
payments.2"3
Based on the New York Court of Appeals' answers, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court.214 Thus, any variation purporting to reduce the one-year period
of the Article 4A statute of repose, (or to impose constructive notice
in lieu of actual notice as stipulated in the statute), would not be
enforceable under the Regatos decision.
IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The principle conclusions that may be drawn from the foregoing
discussion are summarized below.
A. General Rule
The general rule applicable to the UCC applies as well to
Articles 3, 4, and 4A. Under the general rule, the bank is free to
contract out of its liabilities, except that:
(i) the bank cannot disclaim its obligations under the UCC to act
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 634-35.
212. Id. at 635.
213. Id. at 634.
214. Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 431 F.3d 394, 395 (2d Cir. 2005).
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in good faith and exercise ordinary care, and
(ii) the bank cannot disclaim a UCC obligation to the extent that
a UCC provision expressly prohibits the disclaimer.
B. UCC Articles 3 and 4
(i) Banks are generally permitted to disclaim their liability under
UCC Articles 3 and 4 for fraudulent checks. They commonly do so.
(ii) Banks are permitted under Articles 3 and 4 to shorten the
periods in which their customers are required to report fraudulent
checks." 5 The one-year period for reporting fraudulent checks under
the Article 4 statute of repose may be shortened, for example, to a
fourteen-day period, if not an even lesser period.
(iii) Banks are permitted to disclaim their liability for
consequential damages under Articles 3 and 4.
C. UCC Article 4A
Banks are permitted to disclaim their liabilities under Article
4A, except as stated below.
(i) Improper Execution. The bank cannot disclaim its liability
for interest or transactional and incidental costs when it executes a
payment order improperly, such that the execution results in a delay
in payment to the beneficiary, or in (1) non-completion of the
transfer, (2) failure to use the intermediary bank designated by the
originator, or (3) the issuance of a payment order contrary to the
terms of the originator's payment order.
(ii) The Money-Back Guarantee. Under the "money-back
guarantee," the bank cannot disclaim its liability to refund the
amount of the transfer when the payment order goes astray or is
otherwise not properly completed, and the funds are not returned to
the customer.
(iii) Fraud. Banks cannot disclaim their Article 4A liability for
unauthorized payment orders.
(iv) Erroneous Execution: Payment to the Wrong Person. The
bank cannot disclaim liability when, as a result of its erroneous
execution of a payment order, funds are transferred to the wrong
person.
(v) Erroneous Execution: Duplicate Transfers or Excessive
215. U.C.C. § 4-406(d), (f) (2003).
UCC ARTICLES 3,4, AND 4A
Amounts. Although there is ambiguity with respect to the issue, it is
the better view that the bank cannot disclaim liability when, as a
result of its erroneous execution of a payment order, funds are
transferred in duplicate or in an amount that exceeds the amount of
the sender's order.
(vi) Payment to the Beneficiary. The beneficiary's bank cannot
disclaim its liability to pay the beneficiary after the bank has
accepted a payment order, and it cannot enforce an agreement with
the beneficiary to retrieve the payment after it has been made.
(vii) Consequential Damages. The beneficiary's bank cannot
disclaim its liability to pay consequential damages to the beneficiary
if, after accepting a payment order, the bank fails to pay the
beneficiary and the beneficiary has given notice of the circumstances
that may give rise to the consequential damages. This is subject to
the right of the bank to decline payment, if the bank can prove that it
had a reasonable doubt concerning the beneficiary's right to the
payment.
(viii) Short-Period Reporting Requirements. Article 4A is
ambiguous with respect to the enforceability of an agreement to
reduce the one-year period of the statute of repose. However, the
decision in Regatos maintains that a bank cannot disclaim its liability
under Article 4A for the principal amount of a funds transfer by
enforcing a requirement that the customer report objectionable
transfers within a period that is less than one year after the customer
receives actual notice that the bank has been paid for the transfer.
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